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Whatever we write about music is informed (in more ways than we can 
recognize) by our responses to works, genres, theories, performances, per-
formers, and to many other factors, some of which we treat as "extra-
musical." As musicians and as ",riters, we enact our interpretations of prior 
interpretive acts. As scholars, we also reflect on the history of our modes 
of interpretation and compare them with other ways of responding. 
These points offer one approach to a question posed by the organizers 
of this symposium: "With a life that extends well beyond the historical era 
in which it had its genesis, does the musical work (or any artistic work) 
require a special kind of historiography?" At the very least, the production 
and reproduction of music require a historiography that enables us to 
discover some of the prior interpretive moves that have eluded our con-
sciousness. A number of these moves, but by no means all, will have in-
volved responses to works. We have no good reason to isolate histories of 
our interactions with works from histories of our interactions with (for 
example) musical instruments, musicians, spirits, patrons, melody types, 
stories, and aesthetic theories.! A Persian musician who continues to dis-
cover new aspects of Segiih and Chahiirgiih has established a relationship to 
these dastgiihrs (systems of melodic models) that may well resemble the 
relationship of a German or a Korean pianist to the Beethoven sonatas 
and Das wohltemperierte Klavier. In both cases, the relationship between the 
musician and the models or works is the product of a very long series of 
social interactions, an9- the most exhaustive histories can represent only a 
small proportion of these interactions. 
Music histories are histories of performances and of modes or styles of 
performance. Every act of composition is an act of performance, whether 
or not the composer draws up a detailed plan for use in future perfor-
mances. Because there are so many variables in all aspects of performance 
(the resources and instruments, purposes and consequences, etc.), we 
should not take a small selection of these as the "primary concerns" or the 
"central problems" of music historians. One of our special tasks as music 
historians is to trace the changing relationships between the knowledge 
and actions of musicians in various times and places, and the theories and 
practices of people who followed other vocations and avocations. As prod-
ucts of these changing relationships, musicological disciplines help us to 
register and interpret the changes. 
It has often happened, of course, that a fund of terms, metaphors, and 
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stories elaborated with respect to music has been adopted and transformed 
by critics and practitioners of literary, visual, or kinetic arts. For example, 
the language of Chinese texts dealing with the criticism of poetry and 
painting is deeply indebted to earlier Chinese musicology.2 Similarly, when 
Jacques Derrida speaks of texts in which "the labor of writing is no longer 
a transparent ether" but "catches our attention and forces us ... to work 
with it," his words may remind us, once again, of the indebtedness of 
modern European poetry and painting to modern European music and 
ideas about music.3 
A Musical View of the Universe, the title of Ellen Basso's excellent mono-
graph on Kalapalo myth and ritual performances,4 would serve equally 
well for books on many other subjects, as would An Unmusical View of the 
Universe (not yet used as a title, so far as I know). In the late twentieth 
century few of us expect to find "a musical view of the universe" at the 
centers of political and economic power. It is difficult even to imagine 
what such a view might entail for those who hold power, other than "a 
radical aestheticizing of the political consciousness or subconscious" and a 
fascist "transfiguration of brute force through intoxication born of the 
spirit of music."5 In many familiar myths, the powerless are represented as 
"more musical" than the powerful. It is no secret that people who seek to 
live a musical life may find it virtually impossible to reconcile the demands 
of music with those of political or economic interests. We now have ample 
evidence of the consequences for professional and amateur musicians 
when music is relegated to an area of "power-protected inwardness."6 We 
also have more than enough experience to compare many histories of 
musical practices that have been politicized or commercialized in differ-
ent ways. We do not have, and do not need, general criteria that would 
enable us to distinguish between "musical" and "non-musical" actions in 
all known societies and civilizations. 
Arguments about what is or is not "extra-musical" are necessarily spe-
cific to particular sets of circumstances, as interpreted by various inter-
ested parties. Whatever may be true of some of us as individuals, the full 
"population" of musicologists does not constitute a sect, living mainly 
within what Max Weber called the "aesthetic sphere ofvalue."7 Our incen-
tives for musicological research arise from conflicts between several value-
spheres or "life orders," and musicological writing is heavily dependent on 
terms, metaphors, and stories that also occur in accounts of religious and 
political conflicts. We can easily ignite sectarian disputes that develop into 
bad imitations of religious and political quarrels. 
Unless we decide to cancel our lectures and stop producing books and 
papers, we will continue to retell some of the stories that have already 
been told: each critique of one myth will reproduce another myth, by the 
process that Peirce described as "translation of a sign into another system 
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of signs."8 For musicians, "another system" is whatever configuration of 
signs they deem pertinent on a subsequent occasion: for example, a later 
moment in the same performance (or process of composition), a different 
performance, or a discussion of what happened in a given performance. 
In each case, "the meaning of a word [or of a musical cue, a gesture, a 
touch, etc.] really lies in the way in which it might, in a proper position in 
a proposition believed, tend to mould the conduct of a person into con-
formity to that to which it is itself moulded."9 Since so many types of 
translation are possible, it is not surprising that musicologists continue to 
argue about which translations produce the "real" or "true" meanings. 
Such arguments could be settled only by imposing a religious or political 
orthodoxy (one with more powerful tools for suppressing dissent than the 
world has yet seen). 
In the "Mterword" to his Musikgeschichte im Uberblick,]acques Handschin 
underlined the difference between music historians who live in specific 
times and places and the utterly imaginary creatures who do not: 
Our possibilities are unlimited only in the final instance, not in the 
first; for were we capable of apprehending aesthetically every type of 
music-music from all epochs and music of all peoples-we would 
not be human beings in a specific (temporal, national) location, but 
we would be "humankind in itself. "10 
If "humankind in itself' remains unknowable, we can hardly claim that 
"aesthetic apprehension" (however defined) is the normal human response 
to music. Neither musicians nor musicologists can avoid making claims 
about how one should respond in particular situations. Yet everyone real-
izes, to some extent, that others make different claims: "A concurring yes 
. ; . is not only a dissenting no to a different set of yeses but may also be a 
modification or adaptation that rephrases an implicit, perhaps unrecog-
nized, question. "11 Historical and ethnographic studies of musical prac-
tices can direct our attention toward some of these implicit questions, 
even if we could only recognize all of them by becoming "humankind in 
itself. " 
For obvious reasons, it is not uncommon for musicologists working in 
the late twentieth century to adopt "an aesthetic which is essentially con-
sumer-orientated in that music is treated as a kind of commodity whose 
value is realized in the gratification of the listener. "12 The aesthetic that 
Nicholas Cook describes in these terms is not equally available (or, at 
least, not available in the same way) to rich and poor alike: the earth has 
not yet become a giant shopping mall where everybody enjoys unlimited 
reserves of cash and credit. We can observe that a considerable number of 
affluent consumers attend performances of music that would not have 
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been described by the performers and composers as commodities de-
signed for the gratification of listeners. Is it our task, as musicologists, to 
lecture consumers relentlessly until some of them attempt to hear the 
music in what we claim is an appropriate manner? For what proportion of 
listeners does some kind of musicological knowledge (however diluted or 
otherwise transformed) serve as "cultural capital" in Pierre Bourdieu's 
sense, increasing their sense of participation in the music by enabling 
them to feel that they know how to appreciate it?13 
Cook approaches this problem by distinguishing between "musical" and 
"musicological" listening: "If by 'musical listening' we mean listening to 
music for purposes of direct aesthetic gratification, then we can use the 
term 'musicological listening' to refer to any type of listening to music 
whose purpose is the establishment of facts or the formulation of theories" 
(p. 152). Why should the "musical" listener be concerned with facts or 
theories? Bourdieu's answer is that members of the dominant class use 
them in the process of "aesthetic distancing" through which they lay claim 
to "distinction." Cook argues that, for "normal" listeners, "the experience 
of music is not problematical at all; it is, in a sense, the one thing we can 
be sure of' (p. 230). Since his own discussion of "normal listening" is 
highly problematical, it is quite useful in a number of respects. Of particu-
lar relevance to this symposium on Approaches to the Discipline is the ques-
tion of what will happen to musicology should the experience of more 
and more listeners become "unproblematical" in Cook's sense. How would 
we reinterpret the classic texts of our discipline and the large ethno-
graphic literature to which we now have access? 
The answer, I fear, is that these texts would be ignored even more than 
they are at present. Cook has little use for the many writers who have 
treated "the work of music as a moral rather than a perceptual entity" (p. 
227). The normality of his normal listeners could be more easily sustained 
if no one agreed with Richard Kuhns that "interpretation, when exercised 
upon human products, discovers an unconscious domain which is a neces-
sary condition for, and an inevitable accompaniment of, a conscious do-
main."14 No sociologist investigating the production and sale of certain 
commodities would be so naive as to deny the potential significance of the 
consumers' desires, as understood and manipulated by the producers and 
distributors. A musicology that adopted Cook's view of normal, 
"unproblematic" listening would abolish itself as a schollarly discipline. 
Kuhns's impressive Psychoanalytic Theory of Art is an important book for 
musicologists, in part because his interpretation of Freud's theory in rela-
tion to Hegel and others offers an excellent point of departure for reread-
ing musicological texts-those of August Halm, for example, which are 
briefly discussed below. Musical performances (including, as already men-
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tioned, acts of composition), are "enactments" that "organize and focus 
objects in highly cathected ways"-as are (in some instances) the writings 
and lectures of musicologists: any act of performance or writing may pro-
duce representations that can be enacted on a subsequent occasion.15 The 
performances of musicians and listeners, writers and readers "possess a 
latent content whose translation to manifest content will be at once sought 
and resisted" (p. 2S). However relentlessly we may attempt to disclose our 
motives (or, more often, the motives we attribute to others), we can also 
expect to find conjunctions of seeking and resistance in scholarly work, 
inasmuch as "the risk of being exposed to forced disclosure itself becomes 
part of the ground for the creation of enactments, since they subtly repre-
sent delicate matters requiring hiddenness, and are able to disclose the 
otherwise inexpressible" (p. 74). 
An important consequence of Kuhns's argument about latent and mani-
fest content is the need for a "multiplicity of interpretations and responses" 
(p. 32); fortunately, many interpretations of the latent or manifest content 
of music and dance rely more on sounds and gestures than on verbal 
argument. Kuhns has good things to say about the "interpretative reorga-
nization" of enactments in artistic manifestoes (p. 72), recognizing that 
"each interpretation draws a boundary around the variables that can be 
considered in making an interpretation" (p. SO). All of us have good (and 
not-so-good) reasons to dispute and transgress some of the boundaries 
that various authorities seek to enforce. (Kuhns's short book does not 
examine the uses of manifestoes as tools of intimidation.) 
In the past few decades, musicologists have begun to investigate the 
literary genres and conventions employed by writers of artistic and schol-
arly manifestoes, and more generally by theorists, historians, and educa-
tors. I have not seen any history of musical thought or musical pedagogy 
described as "a parable of the history of all sciences, a novel of European 
thought through the millennia"-Thomas Mann's apt phrase for Goethe's 
Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre. 16 Carl Dahlhaus, among others, 
insisted that the music historian's choice of appropriate distancing devices 
needs to be informed by considerable experience with literature. He often 
drew attention to novelistic aspects of music histories, expanding upon 
Handschin's critique of "the general ego" (quoted above): 
We need to question the naivete that recognizes "humanity pure and 
simple" in every historical agent (seen, like the protagonist of a 
novel, as an appropriate object of empathy); but no less disabling is 
the skepticism that can satisfy its [overly] sensitive historical scruples 
only when every semblance of understanding has been destroyed 
and the past lies before us in inaccessible othernessP 
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Dahlhaus, who worked for several years as a Dramaturg, used a number of 
dramatic techniques (particularly in his writings on the history of music 
theory) as he sought to avoid the extremes of naive empathy and un-
bridled skepticism. In the first chapter of Untersuchungen uber die Entstehung 
der harmonischen Tonalitiit, for example, we see Hugo Riemann (like the 
characters in the opening scenes of many plays) making a number of 
mistakes, with consequences that are worked out later. ls Dahlhaus first 
dramatizes the differences between the theories of F€~tis and Riemann 
(pp. 9-18), noting that one should not rule out the possibility of reconcil-
ing them. Before the chapter concludes with a confrontation between 
certain ideas of Riemann and Helmholtz (pp. 51-54), several other theo-
rists are drawn into the action: Riemann misinterprets Rameau (pp. 28-
29), Sechter makes an adaptation of Rameau's theory (pp. 29-33), several 
writers develop theories of the cadence (pp. 33-40), and Riemann misin-
terprets Hauptmann (p. 41). 
Although his own practice may seem somewhat more dramatistic than 
novelistic, Dahlhaus endorsed the suggestion of Hans Robert Jauss that 
historians have much to learn from the narrative techniques of Joyce and 
Proust; in my opinion, those of Musil are even more relevant to music 
historians.19 Our choices as writers on music are not so much among 
literary genres as among different approaches to the genres. Despite the 
claims advanced in numerous manifestos, musicology as a whole has never 
followed the model of a pseudo-historical pageant in which the confusion 
and errors of the past are dissipated by the "blessed assurance" of a brighter 
future. 
As musicologists, we can participate in dramas that continue to enjoy 
long runs, and we can stage revivals of older and allegedly outmoded types 
of drama and storytelling. Some of us may prefer not to renew the ritual 
denunciations of "formalism" that have loomed so large in many parts of 
the world for most of this century. Sooner or later, "formalism" (like any 
other -ism) will lose its effectiveness as a term of abuse, and the dramas in 
which evil formalists conspire against "the people" will be deleted from 
the repertoire or rewritten. Historians can ask (even now) how the so-
called formalists were able to create "a dissenting no to a different set of 
yeses." Such creative acts are possible only when one manages to resist 
demands to keep step with the "progress" of history. No series of attacks 
on "formalism" could possibly serve everyone's interests. 
Lawrence Kramer's manifesto on "The Musicology of the Future" in-
cludes an account of his experience at a recent performance of Mozart's 
Divertimento K 563: he perceived "the performer's (and by proxy the 
composer's) body shuttling, with ambiguity and constraint, between labor 
and pleasure."2o Compare Hermann Abert's account of this work, in which 
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he heard a "healthy, youthful feeling of vitality, which knows how to laugh 
with good humor as well as to be full of enthusiasm"; "all three players are 
equals, and even where one individual takes over the lead, several ideas, 
agreeing or contradictory, spring up in the others, so that we always have 
the impression of the most animated life. "21 The differences between the 
two interpretations are considerable, yet Abert's reference to players who 
"rouse" one another's "own thoughts" in agreement and in contradiction, 
presenting the listener with "the impression of the most animated life," is 
to some extent compatible with Kramer's image of bodies "shuttling be-
tween labor and pleasure." Kramer objects to Charles Rosen's perception 
of a "transference of divertimento form . . . into the realm of serious 
chamber music, making purely intimate what had been public."22 For Abert, 
the tone of the divertimento was "weit intimer und zarter" in comparison, 
not with "serious chamber music," but with the last three symphonies, 
which are the main subject of his chapter. Abert (though not, of course, 
Cook's normalized listeners) might well have agreed with Kramer that 
"Mozart raises [questions] by making his music behave as it does, and 
trusting the listener to hear the music within a broader field of rhetorical, 
expressive, and discursive behaviors" (p. 17). 
I have no quarrel with Kramer's thesis that "listening is not an imme-
diacy alienated from a later reflection, but a mode of dialogue" (p. 17). 
Recalling Kuhns's discussion of manifestoes as instruments for the "inter-
pretative reorganization" of enactments, I can readily imagine that mani-
festoes announcing a "postmodernist perspective" are helpful to Kramer 
and others as they "continue the dialogue oflistening." As a historian and 
ethnographer, I must acknowledge that earlier manifestoes on the "rela-
tive autonomy" of works have been no less helpful to many musicians and 
listeners as they engaged in dialogue with one another as well as with 
whatever additional presences the performance awakened in their imagi-
nations. There are many names for such presences and for aspects of the 
complex relationships people entertain with them: the composer's per-
sona, the performer's magnetism, the spirit of an age or a people or a 
locale, blind faith in genius, idolatry, and fetishism, to name but a few. 
The terms are not identical with the relationships that people enact. 
We have much to learn about the ways in which people talk about the 
dialogues in which musicians and listeners are engaged. All of the talk 
relies on tropes, as Goethe recognized: "We think we are speaking in pure 
prose and we are already speaking in tropes; one person employs the 
tropes differently than another, takes them farther in a related sense, and 
thus the debate becomes interminable and the riddle insoluble. "23 Human 
beings lack the ability to "fully articulate, in words, either the objects [of 
our attention] or ourselves. "24 I have not yet understood the difference 
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between the "postmodernist perspective" that Kramer advocates and the 
various "modern" (or modernizing) critiques of "purity," of which Goethe's 
is one. Whatever the differences, we can perhaps recognize more of what 
happens in our own dialogues as listeners by comparing what we say about 
the dialogues with what others have said about their experiences. The 
tropes used in Kramer's account of listening to K 563 are well repre-
sented in the extensive written records of responses to Mozart and his 
music. 
Those who share Kramer's interest in "strategies that are radically anti-
foundationalist, anti-essentialist, and anti-totalizing" (p. 5) can only smile 
(as may well be his intent) at the definite articles in his title, 'The Musicol-
ogy of the Future." The narrative strategies that consign earlier writing 
and discourse to a repertoire of -isms, while urging us forward to a neces-
sary future (usually named with a new -ism), are as totalizing as narrative 
strategies can become. One can't have much of a dialogue with an -ism or 
a paradigm, unless the dialogue questions the ways in which the -ism was 
named or those in which the paradigm was constructed. Many of the 
other ghosts who still bend our ears (the ghost of Mozart, for example) 
talk back to us more forcefully than paradigms are wont to do (although 
we can make them talk back by challenging their right to exist). 
In his remarks on Kramer's discussion of K 563, Gary Tomlinson con-
jures up the specters of "internalism," "formalism," "aestheticism," and 
"transcendentalism" (p. 20, above)-a formidable quartet of ghosts, which 
makes another appearance as he objects to the "western presumptions" of 
manyethnomusicologists (p. 24). Evidently, these demons will continue to 
wreak havoc for as long as Kramer, or anyone else, imagines a "bond with 
Mozart" (p. 21). One may share Tomlinson's desire "to problematize the 
knowledge of others we come to through their musics" (p. 24) without 
wishing to join a campaign against "cultural constructions" that are "darkly 
tinted for us with modernist ideology" (p. 23). The uses that Tomlinson 
finds for such constructs as "nineteenth- and twentieth-century westernism" 
(p. 23) can produce a "ventriloquist's monologue" (p. 21) just as easily as 
any listener's "conceptions of subjectivity that grant it unrivaled culture-
making powers" (p. 22). 
No doubt all of us are capable of self-deception, whether we are inter-
preting the decisions of a composer-performer or the demands of the 
situation we imagine to be our own (or that of our family, tribe, guild, 
profession, region, nation, epoch, or "culture"). Kramer's (or anyone's) 
close listening to Mozart's music mayor may not endow an imaginary 
"Mozart" with "sweeping subjective powers ... to speak to the critic (ana-
lyst, listener in general) through the music" (p. 20): listeners who sense 
that the processes initiated in performances of this music elude our efforts 
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to participate fully in them do not always seek refuge in myths of "subjec-
tive powers." In any case, we should not place a permanent (or even a 
temporary) ban on all illusions of understanding "Mozart." Musicologists 
can learn to tolerate many varieties of love-including some that may 
strike guardians of our morals as fetishism, idolatry, or some other "per-
version. "25 
August Halm was critical of what he called an ausgepragte Genieglaubigkeit 
in the writings of Heinrich Schenker. He nonetheless conceded that this 
"in no way blind, but downright clairvoyant belief in genius" revealed itself 
in Schenker's work as "a valuable heuristic principle, an incentive to make 
discoveries that do not stand or fall with his faith. "26 This is a good crite-
rion with which to assess our reactions to beliefs and loves we do not 
share: do our prejudices against the belief or the love prevent us from 
recognizing it as an incentive to acts that are "valuable" from one or more 
perspectives? Halm's remark also points to an enduring dilemma faced by 
musicologists: we may have little choice but to understand many beliefs 
and loves as "heuristic principles," but this is not how they are experi-
enced by the believers and lovers. Nietzsche's "philosophizing with a sledge-
hammer," recalled in Kramer's paper, is not always the right response to 
this dilemma. 
In a helpful and provocative paragraph, Tomlinson expands on his 
recommendation that we "interrogate our love for the music we study" (p. 
24). His language immediately brings to mind Foucault's discussion of 
Bentham's Panopticon, in which humans are "object[s] of an investigation 
[information], never subject[s] in a communication."27 Tomlinson does not 
suggest that we should interrogate our love for music and for musicians in 
this manner. It is entirely possible to "dredge up our usual impassioned 
musical involvements from the hidden realm of untouchable premise they 
tend to inhabit" (p. 24) without enacting a drama of interrogation in 
which the style of questioning prevents the answers from altering the 
questioner'S initial stance. 
Without knowing what writings Tomlinson regards as "bound to models 
of culture that see it as made exclusively through the conscious and sub-
conscious intents of historical actors" (p. 22), I fully agree with him that 
these are by no means the only factors to be considered in writing history 
and ethnography. Many ethnomusicological monographs of the past de-
cade pay close attention to questions of political economy-which, of 
course, require some ''western presumptions" that Tomlinson might find 
no less "disconcerting" (p. 18) than Kramer's "confidence in his bond 
with Mozart." His insistence that "the act of close reading ... carries with 
it the ideological charge of modernism" (p. 22) places a strong restriction 
on Tomlinson's earlier statement that "art works inscribe in one fashion 
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lOr anather cultural cancepts, assumptians, aspirations, etc., that govern 
their reception. "28 How can we hope to know in what fashion the concepts, 
assumptions, aspirations have been "inscribed" if we must sacrifice "close 
reading" in order to exorcise the ghost of modernism and all its cousins? 
Polemicizing elsewhere against what he heard as a call for "greater 
engagement in decontextualized musical sound" in studies of Mrican mu-
sic, Tomlinson maintains that "musicology has trodden this path for a 
hundred years now, with an ever-increasing arrogance of the Same as the 
most pervasive result. "29 One can read musicological writings of the past 
century without arriving at this impression. What we can gain from acts of 
close reading and close listening is, above all, the possibility of rereading 
and rehearing, increasing our recognition of the limitations of paradigms, 
"ideal types," and other constructs. Conversation without close listening is 
pointless. Ethnomusicologists may have acquired more experience than 
Tomlinson is prepared to acknowledge in learning how not to impose our 
conceptions and fantasies about what is or is not ''western'' on the musi-
cians with whom we interact, and in learning to listen, read, and write 
dialogically.30 
Toward the end of his life, Halm published a remarkable account of his 
responses to the music of Beethoven, whom he had once regarded as an 
"enemy" without allowing himself to confess this in so many words.3l He 
was concerned with the consequences of a situation in which "we involun-
tarily take [Beethoven's] music as the symbol of a definite way of being 
human": specifically, the satisfaction that "the mass" of listeners derives 
from Beethoven's music is based on an attitude of self-importance.32 The 
syndrome of "involuntary" attachment to a symbol must be broken if one 
is to respond to the "real" (wirklichen) Beethoven, or to any other musi-
cian. Inasmuch as a composer's musical technique is symptomatic of his 
"underlying desire" (untergriindliche Trieb), the technique (when properly 
understood) indicates the desired response: "a genuine artist's way of 
working offers direct testimony about his convictions, about his attitude 
toward art, and, hence, about the kind of response that he want.s! "33 
Discussion of technical issues enables us to recognize and alter our 
habitual responses; Halm did not suggest that an appropriate response 
must conform to one's interpretation of the composer's desires. Whatever 
causes us to mistrust our perceptions and habitual responses is to be 
welcomed as the necessary first step in replacing a culture that is "narrow" 
and "exclusive" with a culture worthy of human beings.34 To the extent 
that we experience music as symptomatic or representative of "an existing 
culture," the music does not "itself become culture or lead to a culture."35 
Halm's approach to dramatizing "the history of music" (in his book Von 
zwei Kulturen der Musik and elsewhere) was based on the model of the 
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Bildungsroman: the protagonist (humanity in its engagement with "the spirit 
of music") grows older and wiser, learning how to retain and renew some 
of the energy of youth (the Kraftgefuhl that Abert heard in K. 563). The 
culture of fugue, fully acknowledging and developing youthful energies, 
had been followed by the culture of sonata, allowing for coordination and 
control of formal processes but imposing excessive limitations on the "au-
tonomy" of themes, composers, performers, and listeners.36 With the ad-
vantages of hindsight, we can read Halm's text in relation to texts by his 
contemporaries, overhearing but also dramatizing his conversations with 
himself and with his colleaguesY 
The language of Halm's writings is that of a "secularized theology"-
due in part to his training in theology but also, more significantly, to the 
conditions of music, musicology, writing, and scholarship in his time and 
place.38 These are not as different from our own local conditions as we 
might like to imagine. When we are willing to recognize points at which 
our own techniques of storytelling and dramatizing overlap significantly 
with those employed by "others," we can no longer relegate the so-called 
others to a "backward culture" or an "outmoded paradigm." Those who 
learn to read well learn to listen well, and good listeners can also become 
good readers. 
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